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OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge  
 
 Plaintiff Jobe Danganan signed up for home-security services with Defendant 
Guardian Protection Services—locking himself into a three-year commitment based on 
the terms of the agreement. When he moved and sold his house, Guardian continued to 
bill him. Danganan paid for four months of service after his move and then filed 
consumer protection claims against Guardian, alleging fraudulent and deceptive trade 
practices. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Because the clear terms of 
the agreement authorized Guardian to continue to seek payment after Danganan moved 
and did not constitute deceptive conduct on which Danganan could justifiably rely, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
 On April 23, 2013, Danganan and Guardian entered into an Authorized Dealer 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Sales and Monitoring Agreement that would provide Danganan home security services in 
his Washington, D.C. home. In the Agreement, Danganan agreed to pay a “Monthly 
Services Fee” of $44.95. Supp. App. 195. The Monthly Services Fee would be recurring 
every month throughout the three-year initial term of the Agreement.1  
 The Agreement states that Danganan’s “obligations . . . continue even if [he] 
sell[s] or leave[s] the Premises.” Supp. App. 198. (emphasis added). It only allows 
Danganan to terminate the Agreement within three days of execution. Danganan was, 
however, permitted to transfer the Agreement to “someone who purchases or rents [his] 
Premises” if Guardian “approve[s] the transfer in writing.” Id. 
 In September 2014, Danganan moved from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco. In 
November 2014, he sold his Washington, D.C. home. He then provided Guardian with 
written and verbal notice of his desire to cancel his service. On November 17, 2014, 
Guardian wrote a letter “confirm[ing] [Danganan’s] request that the 24-hour monitoring 
of [his] security system be discontinued” and stating Guardian would “no longer respond 
to any signals received from [Danganan’s] alarm system effective 11/18/14.” Supp. App. 
 
1 The three-year term was typed into the Agreement as a “Special Condition[]” and was 
separately initialed by both parties. Supp. App. 195. Though a preprinted section of the 
Agreement stated that the initial term was five years, the “Special Condition[]” of three 
years is controlling because it was added to the form contract, thereby representing the 
parties’ true intent. See Flatley by Flatley v. Penman, 632 A.2d 1342, 1345 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1993) (“When a contract contains either hand or typewritten terms which are in 
conflict with the preprinted terms, the preprinted terms must always yield to the other 
terms because the hand or typewritten term presumably evinces the deliberate expression 
of the parties’ true intent.”). Regardless, as Danganan’s counsel admitted during oral 
argument, whether the term is interpreted as three years or five years does not 
meaningfully affect the analysis of Danganan’s claims. 
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47. The letter also stated—in bold—that “[t]his document serves only to provide 
information regarding service provided and does not alter any of the terms or conditions 
of the existing monitoring agreement in any way.” Id. 
 Guardian continued to bill Danganan after service had been discontinued, and 
Danganan complained. On January 21, 2015, Guardian sent another letter “confirm[ing] 
[Danganan’s] request that the 24-hour monitoring of [his] security system be 
discontinued” and stating that Guardian would be stopping service. Supp. App. 51. In 
bold, the letter informed Danganan that Guardian was “not intend[ing] to terminate [the] 
existing agreement” and that “all terms and conditions, including [Danganan’s] financial 
obligation under [the] monitoring agreement, continue to be in full force and effect.” Id. 
(emphasis added). After service was discontinued, Danganan paid four months’ worth of 
fees, until Guardian stopped billing.  
On June 9, 2015, Danganan filed a class action complaint against Guardian in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. He brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1–201-9.2, and the 
Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, 73 P.S. § 2270.1, et seq. Guardian 
removed the action to federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the case 
was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
On June 13, 2019, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss, finding that 
Danganan failed to allege that he justifiably relied on Guardian’s alleged deceptive 
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conduct and that Guardian’s alleged conduct caused a loss.2 Danganan now appeals. 
II.3 
Danganan raises two counts: one under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices 
and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) and one under the Pennsylvania Fair Credit 
Extension Uniformity Act (“FCEUA”). He contends Guardian violated the UTPCPL by 
engaging in fraudulent or deceptive conduct by requiring him to continue to pay for 
services after he moved from, and sold, his home—and that such payment amounted to 
an unlawful contractual penalty. He also contends Guardian violated the FCEUA by 
attempting to collect money not owed under the Agreement because Guardian had 
cancelled service. Both of Danganan’s claims ultimately fail because the Agreement 
clearly states that Danganan’s financial obligations would continue after he moved or 
sold his home, and therefore, Guardian did not act fraudulently or deceptively by 
continuing to bill Danganan for payments he owed under the Agreement. Consequently, 
Danganan did not justifiably rely on any deceptive conduct.4 
 
2 Previously, on July 26, 2016, the trial court had dismissed the claims because it 
determined that Danganan could not bring Pennsylvania consumer protection claims as a 
non-resident. On appeal, we certified the question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
which determined that Danganan could bring both claims as a non-resident—leading to a 
reversal of the trial court. See Danganan v. Guardian Prot. Servs., 742 F. App’x 634, 637 
(3d Cir. 2018); Danganan v. Guardian Prot. Servs., 179 A.3d 9, 17 (Pa. 2018). 
 
3 The trial court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 The trial court dismissed all claims on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Our review is 
plenary. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 230 
(3d Cir. 2011). In reviewing whether Danganan stated a viable claim, we must accept as 
true all plausible facts alleged in his complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in his 
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A. 
Danganan’s claim under the UTPCPL fails because he does not allege he 
justifiably relied on deceptive or fraudulent conduct by Guardian. The UTPCPL prohibits 
unfair or deceptive trade practices and lists specific types of conduct that are inherently 
deceptive. 73 P.S. § 201-3. Danganan, however, brings his UTPCPL claim under the 
“catch-all” provision that generally prohibits “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which 
creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.” Id. § 201-2(4)(xxi). To state a 
claim under the “catch-all” provision, a private plaintiff must plead justifiable reliance on 
the alleged deceptive conduct. Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186, 201–02 (Pa. 
2007); see Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). Justifiable 
reliance requires a plaintiff to “show that he justifiably bought the product in the first 
place (or engaged in some other detrimental activity) because of the [fraudulent or 
deceptive conduct].” Hunt, 538 F.3d at 222 n.4 (citing Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 777 
A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001)). 
Danganan does not allege justifiable reliance on deceptive conduct because the 
Agreement’s terms are clear. He does not allege he relied on any statement by Guardian 
that he could move and sell his home and not continue to pay. There is no “presumption 
of reliance,” see Hunt, 538 F.3d at 227, and Danganan has not pleaded that he relied on 
any conduct by Guardian other than the terms of the Agreement itself, which stated that 
 
favor. See, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016). 
We may rely on “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Bruni 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
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“[Danganan’s] obligations . . . continue even if [Danganan] sell[s] or leave[s] the 
Premises.” Supp. App. 198. 
The clear terms are controlling. See Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 905 A.2d 462, 468–69 (Pa. 2006) (“When the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document itself.”). 
Danganan moved from his home in September 2014 and sold his home in November 
2014. He then tried to cancel the Agreement and stop his obligations—an action 
prohibited by the clear terms. Danganan has not alleged reliance on any “fraudulent or 
deceptive conduct.” See 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). He has only alleged that Guardian 
enforced the Agreement as written. 
Danganan also argues that the post-contractual conduct by Guardian rises to a 
UTPCPL violation because Guardian misrepresented the amount owed. But, when 
Danganan attempted to cancel the Agreement, Guardian wrote back agreeing to 
“discontinue[]” service and writing—in bold—that its response “does not alter any of the 
terms or conditions of the existing monitoring agreement in any way.” Supp. App. 47. In 
response to another attempt to cancel service by Danganan, Guardian wrote back that 
service would be “discontinued” and—again, in bold—that the document was “not 
intended to terminate [the] existing agreement, all terms and conditions, including 
[Danganan’s] financial obligation under [the] monitoring agreement, continue to be in 
full force and effect.” Supp. App. 51 (emphasis added). With each communication, 
Guardian made clear that the terms of the Agreement continued to apply, which meant 
that Danganan’s obligations continued after he moved and sold his home. Therefore, 
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Danganan cannot claim that he justifiably relied on any deceptive or fraudulent conduct 
by Guardian that indicated he was absolved from making payments.5  
Danganan further contends that an unlawful contractual penalty—even if based on 
clear contractual terms—is itself a violation of the UTPCPL. Danganan only cites one 
case for this proposition, Benson v. Budget Rent A Car Sys. Inc., No. 08-CV-4512, 2011 
WL 4528334 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011), which did not involve UTPCPL claims. In 
Benson, the district court allowed a FCEUA claim to go forward based on a liquidated 
damages clause, in part, because the formula was not stated in the contract—i.e. was not 
a clear term. See 2011 WL 4528334, at *6. Here, the amount Danganan was required to 
pay was spelled out as a clear term, making Benson inapposite.6 
 
5 Danganan requests that we certify a question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
arguing that Pennsylvania courts have not “set[] forth the justifiable reliance standard in 
the context of post-contract performance.” Appellant’s Br. 49–50. Danganan is 
attempting to create an exception to the justifiable reliance requirement under the 
UTPCPL. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has “not recognized any 
exceptions” to the justifiable reliance requirement and “has applied [the requirement] in a 
variety of situations.” Hunt, 538 F.3d at 221. There is no legally significant difference 
between pre- and post-contractual conduct related to the justifiable reliance requirement. 
We decline to grant Danganan’s motion to certify his question. 
 
6 Even if Danganan had pleaded justifiable reliance, he has not pleaded that a reliance on 
Guardian’s alleged “fraudulent or deceptive conduct” caused an “ascertainable loss.” See 
73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi); id. § 201-9.2(a). Danganan claims that charging the full amounts 
of the remaining Agreement after service has been discontinued operates as an unlawful 
penalty. Assuming a claim for paying an unlawful contract penalty of the full contract 
price could amount to a UTPCPL violation, Danganan’s claim here fails because he does 
not allege that he actually paid that penalty. After Guardian discontinued service, 
Danganan had at least 17 months remaining in the Agreement, but he only paid for four 
months’ worth of service until Guardian stopped billing. The amount that he allegedly 
lost due to deceptive conduct is a fraction of the amount he contends constitutes an 
unlawful penalty. Thus, he failed to plead ascertainable loss based on an unlawful 
penalty. 
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B. 
 Danganan’s FCEUA claim is based on the same arguments as his UTPCPL claim 
and also fails due to the terms of the Agreement. The FCEUA prohibits creditors from 
“us[ing] any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means” to collect any debt. 
73 P.S. § 2270.4(b)(5). Danganan acknowledges that his claim under the FCEUA is 
“derivative” of his UTPCPL claim. See Appellant Br. 5. In his FCEUA claim, he alleges 
that Guardian has (1) “misrepresent[ed]” what Danganan owes; (2) “represented” that the 
Agreement could not be terminated by the consumer after the first three business days; 
(3) “represented” that Danganan was required to make payments after services had been 
cancelled; and (4) continued to bill for services no longer provided. Supp. App. 26 ¶¶ 43–
45. 
 Danganan’s contentions all fail based on the terms of the Agreement. The only 
representations Guardian has made are those that are in accord with the unambiguous 
terms of the Agreement. Under the Agreement, Danganan continued to owe payment 
after he moved. Therefore, Danganan has not alleged any “false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations or means” that Guardian used to collect a debt.  
Danganan contends that the FCEUA includes violations of the federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and that Guardian has violated the FCEUA by 
violating the FDCPA. The FCEUA encompasses violations of the FDCPA. See 73 P.S. § 
2270.4(a) (“It shall constitute an unfair or deceptive debt collection act or practice under 
[the FCEUA] if a debt collector violates any of the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act.”). Under the FDCPA, any debt collected must be “expressly authorized by 
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the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).7 Danganan 
argues that Guardian is seeking to collect a payment that is not permitted by Pennsylvania 
law. The FDCPA, however, states that a payment may be either expressly authorized by 
an agreement or permitted by law. Here, the amount owed by Danganan was expressly 
authorized by the Agreement—the monthly amount was explicit, and the requirement that 
Danganan keep paying after he moved and sold his home was clear. Therefore, whether 
or not Pennsylvania law permitted the payment is irrelevant. Neither the Agreement nor 
Guardian’s subsequent actions to collect the amount owed violate the FCEUA.8 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion to 
dismiss. 
 
7 This is also a requirement under the FCEUA itself; using the same language as the 
FDCPA. See 73 P.S. § 2270.4(b)(6)(i) (including as a violation the “collection of any 
amount, including any interest, fee, charge or expense incidental to the principal 
obligation, unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt 
or permitted by law”). 
 
8 Danganan’s argument relating to the FDCPA fails for two additional reasons. First, 
Danganan raised this argument for the first time in his reply brief, making the argument 
waived. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 n.29 (3d Cir. 
1990). Second, a FDCPA violation is actionable under the FCEUA only when it is 
committed by a “debt collector.” 73 P.S. § 2270.4(a). Guardian, however, was a 
“creditor” under the FCEUA, not a debt collector. See id. § 2270.3 (defining a “creditor” 
as a person “to whom a debt is owed or alleged to be owed”); id. (defining a “debt 
collector,” in relevant part, as a person, other than a creditor, “acting on behalf of a 
creditor, engaging or aiding directly or indirectly in collecting a debt owed or alleged to 
be owed”); Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2012) (interpreting these 
provisions); Supp. App. 25 ¶ 36 (Danganan’s complaint, alleging that Guardian is a 
“creditor” under the FCEUA). 
